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IDIOGRAPHIC DIGITAL PROFILING: BEHAVIORAL
ANALYSIS BASED ON DIGITAL FORENSICS
Chad M. Steel
George Mason University
P.O. Box 6136
McLean, Virginia 22102
csteel@gmu.edu
ABSTRACT
Idiographic digital profiling (IDP) is the application of behavioral analysis to the field of digital forensics.
Previous work in this field takes a nomothetic approach to behavioral analysis by attempting to understand
the aggregate behaviors of cybercriminals. This work is the first to take an idiographic approach by examining
a particular subject's digital footprints for immediate use in an ongoing investigation. IDP provides a
framework for investigators to analyze digital behavioral evidence for the purposes of case planning, subject
identification, lead generation, obtaining and executing warrants, and prosecuting offenders.
Keywords: digital profiling, behavioral analysis, forensic psychology
taxonomy relevant to hackers that included most
traditional cybercrimes including virus writing,
hacking, and professional criminals. (Rogers, A twodimensional circumplex approach to the
development of a hacker taxonomy, 2006). Rogers
(2010) further applied the concept of social learning
theory and moral disengagement toward furthering
the understanding of cybercriminal behavior.

1. INTRODUCTION
Behavioral analysis, once the exclusive domain of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s profilers, had
turned into a mainstream area of scientific study.
Originally focused on violent offenders, behavioral
analysis utilizes concepts like motive, modus
operandi, signature behaviors, offender typologies
and victim profiles to better investigate criminal
activity, understand offender motivations, link
criminal acts, and target demographics for
prevention efforts.

Victimology has been studied in several areas of
digital crime. Online fraud and how victims are
selected was studied as part of a Microsoft study on
Nigerian 419 scammers (Herley, 2012). Similarly,
Ngo and Paternoster (2011) looked at victim profiles
in general across multiple types of cybercrime.

Digital behavioral analysis is a relatively new field
that applies the concepts of traditional behavioral
analysis to the digital footprints of criminals. The
crimes analyzed can be digital crimes, or those that
are digitally facilitated through researching,
planning, communicating, documenting, or
otherwise enabling criminal activity. Some
preliminary work was done in this field by applying
a traditional criminological approach to cybercrime.
Grabosky proposed a criminological approach to
computer crime, providing a categorization of
computer-specific offenses (Grabosky, 2000).

Finally, profiles of user behavior on computers have
been researched. In Digital Profiling: A Computer
Forensics Approach and Digital Scene of Crime:
Technique of Profiling Users, Colombini and
Collella (2013) develop a set-theoretic approach to
building a usage profile of an individual on a device
for the purposes of linking profiles across devices
(Colombini, Colella, & Italian Army, 2012).
Most of the prior art takes a nomothetic approach to
behavioral analysis by attempting to understand the
aggregate behaviors of cybercriminals. This work is
the first to take an idiographic approach to digital
profiling by examining a particular subject’s Internet
activities and electronic media for the purposes of

The development of typologies and taxonomies of
cybercriminals has also been proposed. Krone
proposed a typology for a specific type of computer
criminal–the child pornographer (Krone, 2004).
Nykodym, et al. (2005) proposed a similar typology
for insider cybercriminals. Rogers (2010) detailed a
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using digital footprints left behind for immediate use
in an ongoing investigation.

Ulbricht with a picture that matched his Google+ and
LinkedIn pictures.
The Dread Pirate Roberts contain a link to mises.org
in his signature on Silk Road postings. The Dread
Pirate Roberts regularly posted using a Pacific
Standard Time (PST) time code.

2. GOALS OF IDIOGRAPHIC DIGITAL
PROFILES
Building a profile of a subject in a criminal
investigation can be used to provide probable cause
for and facilitate the execution of search warrants,
assist in subject interviews, link criminal activity,
and provide additional case leads. An informative
example can be found in the criminal complaint filed
against Ross William Ulbricht, aka “The Dread
Pirate Roberts”, the alleged mastermind behind Silk
Road, the Darknet service that facilitated the sale of
illegal drugs and banned items over TOR. Silk Road
was estimated to have over one billion dollars (US)
in annual revenue. Some of the key profile findings
that assisted in tracking Ulbricht and obtaining a
warrant for his arrest include the following:

IP address logs showed logins to the Silk Road
website from an administrator at an Internet cade
near Ulbricht's home in San Francisco.
The logins to Ulbricht's Google account occurred
from the home of a friend of Ulbricht’s. Ulbricht and
his friend posted YouTube videos confirming they
lived together.
Ulbricht logged on to the site Stack Overflow with
his Google account information and asked "How can
I connect a Tor hidden service using curl in php?"
One minute after posting, Ulbricht changed his Stack
Overflow name from "Ross Ulbricht" to "frosty" and
his registered email to "frosty@frosty.com". The
SSH key on the Silk Road server was
frosty@frosty.com.

The first mention of Silk Road was on
www.shroomery.org by the user “altoid”, appearing
to be a veiled advertisement for the service and
provide pointers on how to find it. “Altoid” only
posted one message to the site, and directed users to
the blog silkroad420.wordpress.com, which was
started 4 days earlier by an anonymous TOR user.

The special agents investigating Ulbricht eventually
tracked a shipment of fake identity documents that
he solicited as the Dread Pirates Roberts to his home,
and used the above information to tie him to the
illicit Silk Road marketplace. The FBI seized the
Silk Road web servers on 2 October 2013 (United
States Government, 2013).

Two days later, a user with the name “altoid” posted
another advertisement with similar wording for a
“heroin store” on bitcointalk.org and pointed users
to the same blog.

The Silk Road forensics work highlights some of the
key elements of creating a digital profile for an
originally unknown offender. Their investigators
found key identifiers associated with the crime,
linked the anonymous identifiers to sites that had
real name identities, obtained information on the
technical expertise and social interactions of the
subject, and used IP address geolocation to tie
activity in the virtual world to a physical address.
This highlights several of the goals in developing an
idiographic digital profile:

Eight months later, the user “altoid” posted another
message to the bitcointalk.org board looking for an
“IT pro”. The post requested the user respond to
rossulbricht@gmail.com.
The Google account was registered to a Ross
Ulbricht. The picture on his Google+ account was
the same as a Ross Ulbricht that had registered a
LinkedIn account. The LinkedIn account listed
Ulbricht as being 29 years old, with a BS in physics
from the University of Texas and attendance at a
graduate program at the University of Pennsylvania
in Materials Science and Engineering. Ulbricht
stated in his profile that he was now involved in an
"economic simulation" of living in a "world without
the systemic use of force" by "institutions and
governments.



Ulbricht's Google+ profile contained a link to videos
on mises.org. The site had a user profile for Ross
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Cross-site Tracking. Tracing an individual’s
actions across multiple sites through their
use of common phrases, signatures, or
usernames can open up previously unknown
leads. Creating a list of relevant sites can
also generate a list of locations where the
subject’s passwords can be obtained more
easily in the event strong encryption is
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encountered locally, given likely password
reuse (Gaw & Felten, 2006).
Identifying an Anonymous Subject.
Anonymous users are likely to break
discipline and inadvertently use real
information (or a real location) at some
point, creating an avenue for identification.
Using the cross-site tracking information
and legal processes (e.g., subpoenas), a
user’s true identity can be uncovered.
Mapping a Criminal Enterprise. The skills
and sophistication of a subject can identify
their role in a criminal enterprise, ranging
from head boss to technical advisor to hired
gun. Skills can be criminally oriented, such
as building IEDs or hacking, or legitimate
skills that can support criminal activity, such
as financial or coding expertise.
Enumerating Associates. Understanding the
social network that a subject engages with is
helpful in targeting underlings or peers for
initial investigative action. By prosecuting
other subjects lower down the food chain,
investigators can work upward (or sideways,
in the case of peers) to the prime subject.
Having an assessment of the sociability of
the subject can also assist in decision
making regarding the likely efficacy of
consensual monitoring or account takeover
actions.
Obtaining and Executing a Warrant. The
material gathered during the creation of the
profile can help link the subject’s activities
to assist in obtaining probable cause for a
search and/or arrest warrant. Obtaining
information on the countermeasures
deployed by the subject (in the Silk Road
case, deletion of information on a VPN
server) can help in planning the execution to
avoid unintentional or deliberate data
destruction.
Providing Subject Interview Insights.
Understanding the motivation and mindset
of a subject can assist investigators in theme
development for an interview. Additionally,
being able to assess the technical skills of
the subject provides a barometer to
determine if an individual is being deceptive
regarding those skills, and allows

investigators to have the requisite skills
available to assist the interviewers.
The ultimate goal of the proposed framework is to
organize digital intelligence regarding a subject into
a timely, actionable profile.
3. DIGITAL PROFILE FRAMEWORK
The proposed digital profile framework is broken up
into two sections, digital biographical information
and a multi-axis competency/affinity profile. The
digital biographical information consists of
identifiers, websites, signatures, usernames,
passwords, and other information that can provide a
pattern of usage for a subject. It can also include real
life biographical data if that information is known.
The profile axes are both quantitative and
qualitative–they evaluate the subject’s abilities in
four areas: technical ability, countermeasures,
sociability, and domain ability. Both sections of the
profile should be considered dynamic and should be
revised as more information is obtained about the
subject.
3.1 Digital Biography
The digital biography serves as a tracking
mechanism for all currently known (and suspected)
information about the subject’s Internet activities.
The search for information should be iterative–
identifying a unique, new username might trigger a
Google search for permutations of that same
username. Similarly, the identification of a signature
in a web forum posting may trigger a search for that
same signature, leading to additional usernames on
a different forum. The information included can be
considered probabilistic until confirmed through
independent corroboration.
Generally, a single email address or message posting
is the starting point for gathering information. That
identifier is then searched for and the relevant,
resulting pages are subpoenaed to obtain subscriber
information, with any additional identifiers taken
from the returns. That information is then collected,
and the process is repeated iteratively until all leads
are exhausted (Compton & Hamilton, 2011).
Information may be obtained directly via subpoena
or through a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
(MLAT), but not all information is likely to be
located with providers that are accessible through
these mechanisms and some leads may not be able
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to be fully explored. The information that should be
included in the biographical section includes the
following:








Identifiers.
Any
usernames/email
addresses/handles used on any websites are
useful in tracking the activities of a subject.
The more obscure the username, the easier
it is to search for and individuate. When
subpoenaing information from providers,
any subscriber information, IP addresses
that accessed the site under that subscriber’s
identity, passwords (if available), and
answers to recovery questions should be
obtained.
Passwords. Because subjects are likely to
reuse passwords, any passwords available
from sites that do not store hashes (or store
non-salted hashes that can be attacked)
should be obtained. Subjects may re-use
those same passwords on harder-to-break
drive encryption like TrueCrypt or PGP, or
may use permutations of a previous
password. Personal information, including
other passwords, can be used to create a
custom attack dictionary for tools like
AccessData’s DNA or the Passware suite.
Sites Visited. Each of the sites visited by the
subject can be cross-searched for all of the
other identifiers found and the results can be
monitored on a go-forward basis. The types
of sites visited may provide insight into
interests
or
hobbies,
technical
competencies, or social contacts that are
helpful in building a profile. The
investigator should request the web logs of
any accesses from the same IP addresses at
identified sites. These may include referrer
information that links to other sites used by
the subject, or browser string history that
will provide details about the subject’s web
access methods.
IP Addresses. IP addresses used by the
subject can be obtained based on the web
logs from all of the identified sites as noted
above, and through subpoenas to the
subject’s residential Internet Service
Provider. The investigator should also
search for all IP addresses in Google (some
sites leave web logs or similar tracking
mechanisms viewable). Depending on the





circumstances, investigators can request a
trap/trace on any IP addresses of interest,
and may want to consider subpoenas to the
major search providers for additional
activity from those IP addresses. All IP
addresses identified should have the date
and time noted for later correlation through
device forensics.
Locations. Any physical locations
mentioned by the subject or associated with
the subject (through IP geolocation, for
example) should be collected. Posting times
(and time zone information) should be
collected as well for future use in tracking
the subject’s movements and determining
the subject’s current location. Codepages
used and browser languages in request
strings, if logged, can assist in country-oforigin checks.
Associates. The identifiers of all of the
subject’s associates, from contacts on social
networking sites to individuals using the
same IP addresses, should be collected and
retained. The decision on whether or not to
build a profile on known associates will be
an investigation specific decision based on
resource availability.

The biographical information can be correlated with
any non-digital information acquired from
commercial and governmental sources. In the United
States, this includes law enforcement databases like
the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s National
Crime Information Center and commercial
aggregators like Choicepoint, TLO, and LexisNexis. The non-digital information can be iteratively
combined with the digital information until all
reasonable leads have been followed.
3.2 Affinity/Competency Axes
As noted above, psychographic information about an
offender obtained through digital forensics is used to
create a multi-axis profile. The technical ability axis
covers a subject’s technical skill, as well as their
adoption of new technologies (technophilia). The
countermeasures axis looks at the subject’s use of
protective measures both before and after criminal
activity. The sociability axis looks at a subject’s
social interactions, both online and offline. The
domain ability axis evaluates the subject’s
criminally relevant skillset, generally with the help
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of a domain expert. While each axis can be
quantified, which may be helpful in multi-offender
conspiracies when deciding which subject to target,
they are more useful as qualitative measures in
investigative planning, developing interview
themes, and performing investigative actions.

3.2.1.2 Casual User. The casual user is the most
common subject encountered. These subjects grew
up using digital technology or acquired skills and
built proficiency through extensive work or personal
use. They will use technologies that they are
comfortable with, and will adopt new technologies
as they become more commonplace.

3.2.1 Technical Ability

The casual user may have gaps in their knowledge,
but will know how to conduct Internet searches,
install software, send emails and instant messages,
and take pictures with their smartphone and send
them via MMS. The casual user does not understand
nor seeks to understand the science behind most of
what they do, does not read technical blogs, and is
not interested in technology for technology’s sake.
The amount of digital material that the casual user
possesses is going to be a factor of their
discretionary income and their need to keep up with
the Joneses. They will regularly upgrade their cell
phones every two years, will own a tablet and a
laptop, and may have a digital camera lying around.
The casual user is not likely to have multiple hard
drives or extensive amounts of external storage
beyond what they use for backup.

Technical ability, for the purposes of profiling,
consists of a subject’s expertise with digital
technologies, as opposed to other technical skills
(e.g., engine repair). There are two distinct subareas
that are of interest in the investigative profile–
general expertise and the adoption of new
technologies.
General computer literacy can be difficult to assess,
even through direct testing. Self-assessment has
been shown to be inaccurate (Merritt, Smith, &
Renzo, 2005), and the assessor needs to have an
equal or greater level of literacy than the subject to
adequately evaluate their skills. As such, it is
invaluable to utilize digital forensics specialists in
making this assessment. While investigators may
encounter subjects who have a deep expertise in a
narrow area of computing (e.g., printer repair), this
is atypical and can be accounted for by noting the
discrepancy in skills as part of the profile. Subjects
can be grouped into five categories based on their
general computer abilities.

The casual user may have an expansive online
footprint. Extensive use of social media and the
presence of a small number of email accounts are not
uncommon, and are bounded by the sociability axis
rather than technological understanding. They are
likely to use a single search engine, and may
regularly visit web locations based on their noncomputing interests. The casual user has no
problems ordering goods from Amazon, watching
Netflix on their Xbox, or doing banking online.

3.2.1.1 Functionally Illiterate. These subjects are
not likely to make use of digital technologies. They
will have little to no online footprint beyond a single
email account, and if they do utilize a computer it is
to perform a specific task, such as checking email,
that they have learned through rote memorization. If
they have a cell phone at all, it is likely to be a feature
phone and used solely for voice calls. They are not
likely to own or use digital cameras, tablets, or other
high tech gear.

3.2.1.3 Power User. The power user is differentiated
by a love of technology, but does not have a formal
background in computer science or computer
engineering. The power user is very likely to utilize
preventative measures (see countermeasures below)
without a deep understanding of how to deploy
them. They may utilize software like TOR out of
curiosity, and then abandon it shortly thereafter.
They will have multiple email accounts and an
extensive online presence. The power user is more
likely than the casual user to adopt multiple online
personas, and may use different personas for
different actions.

The functionally illiterate subject will resist adopting
new technologies unless provided a use case that
makes it impractical to avoid. There will likely be
minimal digital evidence to examine with these
subjects, though the use of older technologies may
be more common due to their comfort level and
memorization-based understanding. In general,
individuals that are functionally illiterate don’t
require a digital profile.

Power users understand how technology works
together, but are missing many of the foundational
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concepts of computing. They know what an IP
address is, but do not understand how routing works.
They will be able to talk about the features of the
latest chipset, but would not be able to build a logic
gate. The power user is also likely to overestimate
their knowledge base in relation to others.

understanding. They may continue to use a platform
for an extended period, staying with Android phones
instead of moving to iOS just because a sleek new
device is available. Because they have a strong
knowledge investment, they may hold on to older
systems longer, but once they do switch they quickly
attain a mastery level of the new technology. While
power users and IT professionals may have
programming skills, the computer scientist has
software engineering skills. While a programmer
can develop new software, a computer scientist
develops new algorithms.

Power users are very interested in new technologies,
and will acquire the latest and greatest toys to play
with. The power user will install numerous software
packages on their systems. Executing a warrant on
the residence of a power user is likely to require
extensive time, as they will have multiple devices
from most current technological categories.

Executing a search warrant on the home of a
computer scientist should be done with caution.
They are not as likely to have made mistakes in
setting up their systems, and may have employed
less common (or even homebrewed) protections on
their systems.

3.2.1.4 IT Professional. Unlike the power user, the
IT professional uses technology as a means to an
end. They are likely to have a degree or other formal
training in information technology, and are likely to
hold certificates in networking or system
administration. They may have programming skills,
and possess an accurate understanding of the terms
and concepts related to technology that they use in
conversation.

Determining what level of skill a particular subject
is at can be challenging, but there are areas that can
assist in the determination, including:


The IT professional, unlike the power user, is more
likely to bring home their knowledge and expertise
to professionalize their personal technology usage.
They are likely to have a backup strategy, to
maintain up-to-date antivirus on their systems, and
to employ encryption appropriately.



The IT professional may or may not have an
extensive online footprint, depending on their
sociability. Their usage of technology sites is more
likely to be learning and problem-solving oriented,
as opposed to gadget-oriented. Some IT
professionals may be technophiles–like the power
user they might spend discretionary income on tech
toys–but they are more likely to understand concepts
like upgrade cycles and not necessarily buy or
deploy the first version of a new technology.



3.2.1.5 Computer Scientist. The computer scientist
has a deep background in computing, with degrees
in computer science or computer engineering
(although rare, autodidacts at this level do exist).
They possess a deep understanding of computer
operations, and can develop their own software and
hardware if needed.





Education. Does the individual possess
degrees or certifications in digital
technology, or have they attended basic or
advanced skills training?
Terminology.
In
the
subject’s
communications,
do
they
discuss
technology and do they use technical terms
accurately?
Sites Visited. Are the sites they visit
oriented
toward
gadgets,
toward
implementation guidance, or toward
research? Does the subject post on
discussion boards related to technology, and
are they asking for guidance or providing it?
Device Ownership. How frequently does
the subject purchase new cell phones,
tablets, or laptops? What does the subject do
with their old equipment?
Physical Activities. Does the subject attend
conferences
related
to
information
technology or subscribe to professional
journals?

The subject’s technical ability and financial standing
both impact their technophilia, or desire to possess
and use new equipment. A subject may spend a large
amount of their discretionary income on acquiring
the latest technology for social standing reasons as
well as technical reasons. Because of this, the

While the power user employs technology for its
own sake, the computer scientist will be more likely
to stay with a technology for which they have a deep
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possession of the latest device is not necessarily an
indicator of technical ability, but it does show a
willingness to adopt new technology.

countermeasures are likely to be encountered. While
password reuse is a boon for investigators when
strong encryption is encountered, reuse tends to be
inversely proportional to the complexity of the
password employed (Florencio & Herley, 2007).

Subjects who have low technical ability but adopt
technology extensively are frequently the best
individuals to digitally exploit. They are more likely
to incorporate technology into all aspects of their
life, including the criminal ones, and their low ability
may mean they have not taken adequate protective
steps (or implemented them properly if they have).

3.2.2.2 Device Sharing. Subjects that share physical
space with others, including spouses and roommates,
may have common devices. These can include
anything from wireless access points to laptops, and
may have separate user accounts for each individual.
Because sharing generally requires setting up an
additional account, the act of not sharing is a lowlevel
countermeasure.
Subjects
that
compartmentalize their criminal activities may share
some devices but refuse to allow access to others,
potentially making the restricted use devices higher
value targets when performing a forensic triage.

3.2.2 Countermeasures
Related to but separate from the technical axis is the
subject’s use of countermeasures. While there is
some overlap between the subject’s technical ability
and their use of basic protections, it is not absolute.
The computer scientist may not bother to encrypt
their hard drive for performance reasons, while the
casual user may have a password and encryption
employed on their new iPhone because it was
recommended by a friend.

3.2.2.3 Network Usage. The conditions under which
a subject connects to the Internet can show both their
technical knowledge and risk aversion. At home, a
reasonable countermeasure would be the use of
WPA2, which comes pre-configured on most
modern routers. Using a wired-only connection may
be a countermeasure (or may indicate the subject is
a high-end gamer or using older equipment). An
aware subject isn’t likely to login to their personal
email from a hotel kiosk, but they may use open
wireless access points in places with few cameras to
connect to the Internet semi-anonymously.

Countermeasures can be grouped into two
categories–those that are deployed to prevent
detection, and those that are deployed to hamper an
investigation. Some technologies, such as
encryption, can serve both purposes–a child
pornographer might encrypt files that they send to
other child pornographers to prevent their email
provider from detecting the contraband traversing
their network. Similarly, they may encrypt their files
at rest to prevent them from being used as evidence
against them if they are caught.

3.2.2.4 Basic Software Protections. Most
computers come with at least a trial version of antivirus and anti-malware software pre-installed.
Because automatic updates to the operating system
are turned on by default in modern operating
systems, patch currency is less of an indicator than it
used to be. More technical users may custom
configure software firewalls, turn off unnecessary
services, or run additional anti-malware software. At
the extreme, a subject may run a profiling
application to identify new applications or services
on their system.

Although the use of digital countermeasures by
criminals has been well documented for decades,
(Denning & Baugh Jr., 1999) they have not been
evaluated on a continuum to-date. There are multiple
levels of digital countermeasure that can be
deployed by criminals detailed below, and each
represents a higher degree of protection (and
possibly paranoia).
3.2.2.1 Passwords. Passwords have become so
ubiquitous that their absence is more of an anomaly
than their presence. Despite user education,
however, most users will choose poor passwords in
the absence of complexity controls. Additionally,
users will re-use passwords (or variants of
passwords) on multiple sites. Choosing stronger
passwords and not re-using passwords show
disciplined
behavior and
more
complex

3.2.2.5 Encryption. The use of encryption generally
requires the subject to take active steps to install and
manage additional software. Subjects can use
encryption at-rest, and software including PGP and
TrueCrypt can provide encrypted files, encrypted
containers, or encrypted drives that cannot be
unencrypted by brute force if the subject chooses a
strong password. Encrypted containers and
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encrypted files are of particular interest in that they
indicate selective encryption and can provide
pointers to areas of interest. At the high end, a
subject may employ encryption for network
communications as well in the form of a VPN. A
subject that is using open wireless access points and
a VPN connection to a third party server is utilizing
very high levels of countermeasures.

more likely to be vigilant about aberrant connections
and processes. Finally, the use of extreme
countermeasures by individuals with low technical
ability may indicate the involvement of outside
expertise.
3.2.3 Sociability
Sociability, or the preference for engaging with
others instead of being alone, is a more important
measurement for profile development than shyness
(an emotional tension when interacting with others).
The willingness of an individual to engage in social
interactions is a more important factor in deciding
how to approach an individual than their internal
emotional state when the interaction is occurring.
Additionally, for online communications, shyness
has been found to have an impact on certain
technologies but not others. Shyness is negatively
correlated with the number of Facebook friends an
individual has (Orr, et al., 2009), but not correlated
with email or chat usage (Scealy, Phillips, &
Stevenson, 2002). While sociability is of primary
use, noting factors related to shyness may explain
excessive nervousness or anxiety during the baseline
questioning in an interview.

3.2.2.6 Anonymizers. At the easy end of anonymity,
a subject may use In Private modes in their web
browsing software. While this prevents the
recording locally of activity, it does not provide
anonymity to the server. For this, subjects need to
use web-based anonymizers to hide their browsing.
Similar services are available for email via
anonymous remailers. Even more sophisticated is
the use of onion routing software like TOR to route
traffic through multiple hops before reaching its
destination. This provides layers of anonymity that
are difficult to trace back, but comes at a speed cost.
Subjects using TOR have made a conscious decision
to trade usability for protection.
3.2.2.7 Steganography. While steganography is
much-hyped, in practical terms it has limited uses as
a countermeasure. When communicating covertly,
steganography can be used to hide content in plain
sight, but encryption is a more general purpose tool
to transmit secret messages. As such, steganography
identified on a subject’s machine is indicative of fear
of the presence of a message being found out as
opposed to the message itself.

The Cheek and Buss five point sociability scale can
be used as a baseline for measuring sociability in the
profiling process. While their scale includes selfreported answers to questions like "I'd be unhappy if
I were prevented from making many social
contacts", the same characteristics can be measured
indirectly (albeit with less precision) using features
extracted during the digital forensics process
(Cheeck & Buss, 1981). The following four features
should be reviewed to evaluate the sociability of a
subject.

3.2.2.8 Counterforensics. At the highest end of the
countermeasure spectrum are counterforensics
techniques. These include false flag operations
(intentionally fabricating forensics information to
frame another individual or entity), cleanup routines
that alter logfiles to remove traces of a subject’s
activities, and destructive wiping which makes
logical data irrecoverable for later analysis. The use
of counterforensics techniques indicates that there is
strong technical knowledge present in either the
subject or someone advising the subject, and that the
subject places a high value on their criminal
activities not being uncovered.

3.2.3.1 Sources of Interaction. The different
methods that an individual uses to communicate
online can be enumerated. Methods may include but
are not limited to social media pages, forums, chat
rooms, instant messaging clients, and email. The
number of different methods and the number of
accounts present for each method can be compared
to expected numbers based on the person’s age,
position, financial status, and technical ability.
Additionally, the immediacy and directness of
interaction should be considered. Posting to a forum
does not involve a real-time conversation, and is
generally not to a specific person. Skype chats,
however, are real time and are closer to in-person

Identifying the countermeasures in use can allow
investigators to avoid digital tripwires in serving
warrants or seizing devices. Additionally, any digital
surveillance can be curtailed for subjects who
employ more extreme countermeasures as they are

14

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 9(1)
interactions. More direct, extensive sources of
interaction would tend to indicate a higher
sociability score.

conduct may be hacking ability, virus writing, or the
acquisition of child pornography. Offline expertise
could include anything from the ability to break into
a house to bomb building. Cross-domain criminal
skills can include talents that are applicable to
multiple criminal endeavors and include areas
ranging from observational skills to social
engineering.

3.2.3.2 Volume of Interaction. While the total
number of accounts the subject has is indicative of
their signing up for various services, they may do so
to test out an application or for a one-time use (e.g.,
throwaway email accounts used to register for a
questionable website). The number of individuals
that a subject interacts with and the frequency of
interaction with each individual can provide insight
into sociability. This can include email contacts,
Facebook friends, or chat room partners. In addition
to the number of interactions, longer responses to
messages and attempts to prolong conversations by
asking questions or engaging on other topics can be
seen as markers of high sociability.

Ericsson, et al. (1993) identified 10,000 hours of
practice as the defining time to becoming an expert
in a variety of fields, ranging from chess to music.
Similar work has shown that criminals develop
expertise in their specific areas based primarily on
experience. Wright, et al. (1995) studied residential
burglaries and showed that experienced burglars
identify more vulnerabilities in homes than lay
persons. Additionally, criminal experience has been
shown to develop expertise in the perceptions of
violent criminals (Topalli, 2004). In the online
world, the value placed on criminal technical skills
is evidenced by the purchase of these skills by
groups ranging from traditional profit-seeking
cybercriminals to terrorists (Radianti, Rich, &
Gonzalez, 2009; Warren & Streeter, 2006).

3.2.3.3 Responsivity. Individuals with a high
sociability are more likely to seek out interaction,
and a higher rate of conversations that they initiate
(as opposed to respond to) is expected. Additionally,
developing a forensic timeline of a subject’s usage
patterns can show how quickly they interact with
others once they begin using a device or service.

Most of the criminals encountered will have subexpert skill levels in their domain. This provides an
opportunity and a challenge. The opportunity is that,
if the investigative team has a true expert available,
they will likely be able to accurately assess an
individual of lesser skills. The challenge is that, in
many criminal domains, a subject with sub-expert
level skills can still have a large impact, and the
difference between a talented amateur and an expert
may not be meaningful in developing a profile.

3.2.3.4 Interaction Duration. Subjects with higher
sociability would be expected to have longer
conversations, and more verbose and thoughtful
qualitative responses to individual messages. For
real-time conversations, the exact duration of
interaction can be directly measured based on
session time. For offline interactions, the time
between the first and last posting by the subject can
serve as a long-term communications duration.
Individuals who have a large number of meaningful
interactions that show positive sociability are more
likely to want to engage during an interview.
Additionally, they may make better targets for
potential consensual monitoring engagements, and
are more likely to have spoken with associates about
information that may be meaningful to an
investigation. For those with extremely high
sociability, investigators may only need to make
themselves available online in the proper context
and the subject may engage them.

There are several steps involved in building a
technical profile based on a subject’s criminal
domain knowledge. Identifying a relevant domain,
assessing the amount of time the subject has spent in
that domain, evaluating the subject’s use of language
and terminology related to the domain, and
determining the subject’s standing amongst others in
that domain are the key factors in evaluating the
subject’s criminal expertise.
3.2.4.1 Identify Relevant Domain(s). The criminal
domains of interest are generally pre-determined
from the type of crime being investigated and
determined prior to the technical profile
development. In a virus writing case, malware
development would be the relevant domain. For a

3.2.4 Domain Knowledge
The most difficult factor to qualify (or quantify) is
the subject matter expertise of an individual in the
criminal conduct of interest. For online crimes, the
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terrorist attack involving a suicide vest, bomb
making would be the relevant domain. Less obvious
are the secondary criminal domains that may be
relevant. The virus writer may have needed expertise
on air gaps in place at a location to write an effective
virus, requiring research and surveillance skills.
Similarly, the terror group may have needed
targeting skills to identify a high impact venue and
recruiting skills to identify and enlist individuals to
deploy their weapons. For criminal enterprises, all
subjects should be assessed against the relevant
domains for the enterprise as a whole to determine
their role(s) in the organization.

baseline education and experience as criteria to join.
This may be apparent through emails from a
professional association or online access to restricted
journals in a field.
3.2.4.3 Evaluate a Subject’s Use of Terminology.
There are generally linguistic clues available in a
subject’s correspondence as to their level of
expertise in a domain. A subject’s use of uncommon
terms particular to a domain, and their proper use of
those terms, are related to their level of domain
expertise. An individual talking intelligently about
the virtues of Classless Inter-Domain Routing is
more likely to have an advanced knowledge of
networking than a person that refers to opening their
web browser as “clicking on the Internet”. The
terminology can be identified as part of processing
correspondence, and looking at term frequency of
the subject’s correspondence against the baseline
term frequency of others in a conspiracy (or against
the general public) can quickly tease out
differentiators.

3.2.4.2 Assess Experience in a Domain. Because
experience is the key factor in expertise, assessing a
subject’s prior domain experience is valuable. The
duration of the experience, coupled with the amount
of time the subject focused on that experience, can
be partially measured through digital interactions.
The first visit to a website or forum related to the
domain, or the first email exchange to mention
keywords related to the domain, may point to the
initiation of interest in that area. This will become
increasingly true going forward with increased
adoption of services like Google Mail that allow
users to retain correspondence indefinitely.

Terminology-based assessments can be performed
on web searches as well. Jenkins et al showed
quantitative differences in how domain experts
search as opposed to non-experts. Domain experts
were shown to have a more depth-first approach in
their search strategies, and this expertise was able to
be differentiated from search ability (Jenkins,
Corritore, & Weidenbeck, 2003).

Following the identification of the initial interest, the
percentage of online time spent engaged in a domain
can likewise be measured. Activity information is
generally readily available through proxy logs,
Internet history extracted from seized devices, and
trap-and-trace order results. While explicit
information on interests can be gleamed from
correspondence if available, implicit interest can be
identified through time spent on particular web
pages and the amount of scrolling done (though
these are both difficult to measure forensically)
(Claypool, Le, Wased, & Brown, 2001).

3.2.4.4 Professional Standing. While investigators
may think of a profession in terms of legal
endeavors, criminals have professions as well. They
form groups that rely on specialized experience to
obtain compensation, and can have hierarchies
within these groups that are meaningful. Because
there are no board certifications or elections for
hackers, their absolute location and status in the
knowledge pantheon cannot be definitively
identified. Their relative position can be established,
however, by an analysis of their interaction with
others in their profession.

With an increase in the usage of computer-based
training, including online degree programs, formal
evidence of related education to a criminal domain
may be available as well. An online master’s degree
in biochemistry may increase the threat potential of
a subject browsing information on chemical warfare,
whereas completing a certification program as a
locksmith would be relevant in a breaking-andentering case. Similarly, subjects may have related
indicators of relevant education, including
memberships in professional organizations that have

The primary method for digitally exploiting social
networks for expertise is through the subject’s online
communications. Link analysis of messaging from
multiple sources can quickly allow investigators to
identify “hubs” – individuals whose expertise is
sought by others and have larger numbers of
interconnections with other experts. On a microscale, individual communications can be examined
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While the agents pursuing Silk Road weren’t
necessarily using a formal digital profiling
methodology, codifying their work and the work of
investigators who have faced similar challenges
allows for the development of a framework for
practical use. The guidance presented in this paper is
provided to investigators to assist in creating an
idiographic digital behavioral profile in active
criminal cases. The profile can be developed
iteratively and refined during the course of an
investigation. When multiple potential users are
involved, as may be the case with judicially
authorized data intercepts of Internet traffic (e.g.,
from a wireless access point), profiling can assist in
subject disambiguation. Ultimately, a successful
profile will provide immediate value to investigators
in case planning, subject identification, lead
generation, obtaining and executing warrants, and
prosecuting offenders.

to determine the context of the correspondence. If
the ratio of queries within a domain that an
individual responds to is higher than the ratio of
queries they generate, whether in online forums,
email communications, or text messages, they are
likely to be regarded as having a higher level of
expertise. An even more accurate measure, if the
correspondence is available, is messages between
others previously identified as experts that reference
the subject. Sentiment analysis in linked messages
that mention the subject can provide an evaluation of
their skills that is unbiased, as opposed to being
potentially clouded by the deference that may be
shown in direct communications due to nonexpertise related hierarchical relationships.
Expertise determinations can help link crimes,
eliminate subjects, determine how long a subject has
been operating, and ensure the investigative team
has the necessary skills to pursue the subject. With
increasing adoption of digital education and the
breadth of digital communications channels
available for forensic exploitation, a subject’s
expertise can be sufficiently approximated before
the need for direct interaction.

REFERENCES
1. Cheeck, J. M., & Buss, A. H. (1981). Shyness
and sociability. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 41(2), 330.
2. Claypool, M., Le, P., Wased, M., & Brown, D.
(2001). Implicit interest indicators. Proceedings
of the 6th International Conference on Intelligent
User Interfaces, ACM, 33-40.
3. Colombini, C., & Colella, A. (2013). Digital
profiling: A computer forensics approach.
Availability, Reliability and Security for
Business, Enterprise and Health Information
Systems, 330-343.
4. Colombini, C., Colella, A., & Italian Army.
(2012). Digital scene of crime: Technique of
profiling users. Journal of Wireless Mobile
Networks,
Ubiquitous
Computing,
and
Dependable Applications.
5. Compton, D., & Hamilton, J. (2011). An
examination of the techniques and implications
of the crowd-sourced collection of forensic data.
Third International Conference on Privacy,
Security, Risk and Trust (PASSAT), IEEE, 892895.
6. Denning, D. E., & Baugh Jr., W. E. (1999).
Hiding crimes in cyberspace. Information,
Communication & Society, 2(3), 251-276.
7. Ericsson, K. A., Krampe, R. T., & Tesch-Römer,
C. (1993). The role of deliberate practice in the

4. CONCLUSION
The Silk Road case provided an excellent window
into how a digital profile can be used in an
investigation. The agents involved did an exemplary
job and built a digital biography of the Dread Pirate
Roberts that allowed them to link seemingly
unrelated accounts and activities that ultimately
identified the subject. Additionally, they used
affinity and competency evaluations as evidence in
the complaint process–several of the statements
made by Ulbricht relating to coding and server
maintenance were presented as evidence of his
technical expertise and domain knowledge to
establish that he was involved in the development
and running of the site. Ulbricht’s use of
countermeasures became part of his undoing as
well–his purchase of fake identity documents and
use of encrypted VPN tunnels helped facilitate his
identification and arrest. Finally, agents exploited
Ulbricht’s sociability in communicating with him
when Ulbricht attempted to arrange a murder-forhire hit on FriendlyChemist, a former Silk Road
vendor (United States Government, 2013).

17

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 9(1)

8.

9.

10.

11.
12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

acquisition
of
expert
performance.
Psychological Review, 100(3), 363.
Florencio, D., & Herley, C. (2007). A largescale study of web password habits. Proceedings
of the 16th International Conference on World
Wide Web, ACM, 657-666.
Gaw, S., & Felten, E. (2006). Password
management strategies for online accounts.
Proceedings of the Second Symposium on
Usable Privacy and Security, ACM, 44-45.
Grabosky, P. (2000). Computer crime: A
criminological overview. Workshop on Crimes
Related to the Computer Network, 10th United
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime
and the Treatment of Offenders. Vienna.
Herley, C. (2012). Why do Nigerian Scammers
say they are from Nigeria? WEIS.
Jenkins, C., Corritore, C. L., & Weidenbeck, S.
(2003). Patterns of information seeking on the
Web: A qualitative study of domain expertise
and Web expertise. IT & Society, 1(3), 64-89.
Krone, T. (2004). A typology of online child
pornography offending. Australian Institute of
Criminology.
Merritt, K., Smith, D., & Renzo, J. (2005). An
investigation of self-reported computer literacy:
Is it reliable. Issues in Information Systems, 6(1),
289-295.
Ngo, F. T., & Parternoster, R. (2011).
Cybercrime victimization: An examination of
Individual and Situational level factors.
International Journal of Cyber Criminology,
5(1), 773-793.
Nykodym, N., Taylor, R., & Vilela, J. (2005).
Criminal profiling and insider cyber crime.
Digital Investigation, 2(4), 261-267.
Orr, E., Sisic, M., Ross, C., Simmering, M. G.,
Arseneault, J. M., & Orr, R. R. (2009). The
influence of shyness on the use of Facebook in
an undergraduate sample. CyberPsychology &
Behavior, 12(3), 337-340.
Radianti, J., Rich, E., & Gonzalez, J. J. (2009).
Vulnerability black markets: Empirical evidence
and scenario simulation. 42nd Hawaii
International Conference on System Sciences,
IEEE, 1-10.
Rogers, M. K. (2006). A two-dimensional
circumplex approach to the development of a
hacker taxonomy. Digital investigation, 3(2),
97-102.

20. Rogers, M. K. (2010). The psyche of
cybercriminals: A psycho-Social perspective. In
Cybercrimes: A Multidisciplinary Analysis, 217235. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
21. Scealy, M., Phillips, J. G., & Stevenson, R.
(2002). Shyness and anxiety as predictors of
patterns of Internet usage. CyberPsychology &
Behavior, 5(6), 507-515.
22. Topalli, V. (2004). Criminal expertise and
offender decision-making: An experimental
analysis of how offenders and non-offenders
differentially perceive social stimuli. British
Journal of Criminology, 45(3), 269-295.
23. United States Government. (2013, September
27). Criminal Complaint. Retrieved on October
11, 2013 from
http://www.scribd.com/doc/172773407/Ulbrich
t-Criminal-Complaint-Silk-Road
24. Warren, P., & Streeter, M. (2006). Cyber Alert:
How the World is Under Attack from a New
Form of Crime. Vision Paperbacks.
25. Wright, R., Logie, R. H., & Decker, S. H.
(1995). Criminal expertise and offender decision
making: An experimental study of the target
selection process in residential burglary. Journal
of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 32(1),
39-53.

18

